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Abstract 
 It has become increasingly popular for statistics to be used in the prediction of wine 
prices.  In fact, the prices of mature wines produced in the Bordeaux region of France have been 
accurately predicted by vintage growing-season characteristics.  This paper analyzes the 
relationships among wine prices, ratings, advertising, and production, using data obtained from a 
wine ratings magazine, Wine Spectator.  It presents a model of wine price based on information 
about production quantity, vintage, country of origin, and wine type.  This paper then examines 
the scoring method of Wine Spectator by evaluating the effects of wine price on wine rating.  
Finally, the effects of awards and advertising on wine ratings are studied.  It is found that, ceteris 
paribus, doubling the number of cases produced decreases the price of wine by $2.36 and each 
additional dollar in price increases rating by .0942 points.  In addition, wineries that advertised in 
Wine Spectator during the years 1999 or 2000 received reviews that were .402 points higher than 
wineries that did not advertise during the same time period, holding all other variables constant. 
 
 
This paper has greatly benefited from the guidance of Jonathan Reuter, who generously provided valuable 
suggestions as well as the data on wine advertising and awards.  Additionally, Professor Peter Davis of the 
Economics Department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has acted as the advisor of this Undergraduate 
Research Opportunities Program (UROP) project.  I gratefully acknowledge their help while remaining culpable for 
any errors.   
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I.  Introduction 
Wine is an experience good whose quality can only be assessed after a bottle is opened 
and its contents are tasted (Reuter (2000)).  When looking for a good wine, the uninformed 
consumer, who has limited knowledge of wine types and quality, will often set a price floor on 
the amount that he is willing to pay.  For example, the consumer may opt for a $100 bottle of 
champagne rather than a $10 bottle because he believes that price is positively correlated with 
quality.  Therefore, wine is a good for which demand increases with price on a certain interval.  
Wine is a Giffen good; it defies the Law of Demand.  When deciding on price settings and types 
of wine production, wineries attempt to maximize either profit or utility.  Given that demand 
increases with price, some poorer-quality wines may be sold at high prices in order to mislead 
uninformed consumers about quality level and generate larger profits.  Reuter (2000) claims that 
wine manufacturers are willing to accept smaller profits in return for the pride of producing the 
best wines; he refers to this phenomenon as “valuing the winery owner experience.” 
 Studies performed by Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Lalonde (1995) indicate that the auction 
prices of mature wines are measures of true quality.  There are currently two schools of thought 
concerning prediction methods for the future quality of wines that have not yet matured.  
Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Lalonde belong to the school that bases predictions of wine quality 
on the growing conditions of its constituent grapes; vintage growing-season characteristics such 
as region and weather determine the price of mature wines.  Through statistical analysis, 
Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Lalonde show that the quality of red wines from the Bordeaux region 
of France, as judged by the prices of mature wines, can be accurately predicted by the weather 
during the growing season that produced the wines.  Tasting note and rating manufacturers 
belong to the other school, which uses tasting impressions at a single point in time to form 
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predictions on future wine quality.  Ashenfelter (1995) and Reuter (2000) make the point that 
tasting impressions of young wines can be quite misleading.  Wine Spectator, whose online 
search engine provided the data for my study, is among the most well-known tasting note and 
rating manufacturers.  
This paper examines the effect of quantity of production and vintage growing-season 
characteristics on current prices of wine that has yet to mature, the correlation between wine 
price and rating, and whether tasters for Wine Spectator are biased toward giving better ratings to 
wineries that advertise.  The prices of immature wines are used to study the effect of growing 
conditions since I wish to see if the correlation between vintage-growing characteristics and 
price is as strong for immature wines as it is for mature wines; in addition, auction prices of 
mature wines are not easily accessible.  Shewbridge (1998) investigates the relationship between 
prices and ratings, using data from Wine Spectator magazines published in 1994.  In his study, 
Shewbridge discovered that price and rating are positively correlated, but there are many 
inexpensive wines that receive high ratings and a few expensive wines that receive low ratings.  
This paper expands on Shewbridge’s work by using several years of data from Wine Spectator 
and evaluating data on advertising in order to examine possible biases toward better ratings. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a description of 
Wine Spectator and the data I use.  In Section III, I present the empirical framework and discuss 
models of wine price and rating.  Section IV is devoted to estimation results of wine price and 
rating based on vintage growing-season characteristics and advertising.  Section V concludes. 
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II.  Data 
The Wine Spectator online database consists of approximately 87,000 entries containing 
information on wine price, rating, type, country, region, vintage year, varietal, date of review, 
and tasting notes.  The Wine Spectator data were combined with advertising data provided by 
Jonathan Reuter.  Observations from vintage years prior to 1995 or for which there was no 
available advertising data were dropped from the sample in order to minimize misspecification 
errors.  Summary statistics for the data sample used in this paper are presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable   # of Observations  Mean  Standard Deviation 
price    5870        23.37        30.46 
cases produced  5376    8844.88       34695.71 
type    5908            .64            .50 
rating    5908        85.91            3.83 
ln(cases produced)  5376          7.54            1.63 
advertising 1999-2000 5908            .20                          .40 
advertising prior to 1999 5908            .14                          .35 
 
Sources: The Wine Spectator Online, Jonathan Reuter 
Notes: The variable “type” refers to wine type; in the data, type is set equal to 0 for white wines, 1 for red wines, and 
2 for dessert wines.  The wine rating scale is from 0 to 100.  The dummy variables “advertising 1999-2000” and 
“advertising prior to 1999” are set equal to 1 if the winery advertised in the specified time period and 0 otherwise.  
Dummy variables for 74 wine varietals, 38 regions, 5 countries, 4 vintage years, and the interaction between country 
and vintage year are present in text format.  
 
The data contain 5908 wines, for which there are 5870 observations on price, 5376 
observations on cases produced, and 5908 observations on type, rating, advertising during 
January 1999-December 2000, and advertising prior to 1999.  The variable ln(cases produced) 
was generated using data on number of cases produced.  The data also contain variables 
indicating wine varietal, country, region, vintage year, and interaction between country and 
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vintage year; these variables appear in text form and therefore are not included in the calculation 
of summary statistics. 
The mean price of the wines in the data is $23.37, with a relatively large standard 
deviation of $30.46.  The mean number of cases produced is 8844.88, also with a relatively large 
standard deviation, 34695.71.  These data indicate that the pricing and production of wine do not 
follow a normal distribution.  There are many wines whose prices are clustered between $0 and 
$23.37; the price observations of wines above $23.37 are more spread out.  Data on production 
quantities show that many wines are produced in quantities between 0 and 8844.88 cases and the 
remainder, which are produced in quantities greater than 8844.88 cases, are distributed more 
sparsely.  The laws of supply and demand lead to the intuition that price and number of cases 
produced are negatively correlated.  In Section IV, I estimate the relationship between price and 
ln(cases produced), examining the effects on price of doubling the number of cases produced. 
   The “type” variable is set to 0 for white wines, 1 for red wines, and 2 for dessert wines.  
Most of the wines in the sample are either white wines or red wines.  The “rating” variable 
indicates the numerical score from 0 to 100 given to a wine by Wine Spectator.  The wine ratings 
categories are listed in Figure 2.  The mean rating is 85.91, which falls in the “Very Good” 
range; a standard deviation of 3.83 indicates that most wines fall in either the “Good” or “Very 
Good” categories. 
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Figure 2. 
Wine Spectator Rating Categories 
     95-100  Classic 
90-94   Outstanding 
85-89   Very Good 
80-84   Good 
70-79   Average 
Below 70  Below Average to Poor  
 
 Source: Wine Spectator 
 
 The dummy variables “advertising 1999-2000” and “advertising prior to 1999” are set to 
1 if the winery advertised and 0 if the winery did not advertise in the specified time period.  20% 
of the wines in the sample were produced by wineries that placed advertisements in Wine 
Spectator between January 1999 and December 2000.  14% of the wines were produced by 
wineries that advertised prior to January 1999.  I assume that advertisements that appeared in 
Wine Spectator between January 1999 and December 2000 were placed after the wines were 
reviewed, whereas advertisements that appeared prior to January 1999 were placed before the 
wine were reviewed.  Therefore, possible biases in ratings due to advertising can only be 
attributed to advertising prior to 1999, since wineries may have advertised in the 1999-2000 time 
period because they received high ratings. 
 
III.  Empirical Framework 
Estimation  
An exponential specification of the price function is estimated as: 
Y1 = α0 + α3ln(X3) + α4iX4i + α5iX5i + α6iX6i + α7iX7i + α8iX8i + α9iX7i*X8i + εi  (1) 
where Y1 is wine price, X3 is number of cases produced, X4i represents wine type, X5i is wine 
varietal, X6i corresponds to region, X7i is country, and X8i represents vintage year.  X4i, X5i, X6i, 
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X7i, X8i, and X7i*X8i are dummy variables for vintage growing-season characteristics.  X7i*X8i 
represents the interaction between country and vintage year dummy variables, and εi is an 
exogenous random error term. 
 
I estimate the model for rating given by Wine Spectator as: 
Y2 = β0 + β2X2 + β3ln(X3) + β4iX4i + β5iX5i + β6iX6i + β7iX7i + β8iX8i + β9iX7i*X8i + ui (2) 
where Y2 is the rating the wine receives and X2 represents the price of the wine.  X3i, X4i, X5i, 
X6i, X7i, and X8i are defined exactly as they are for equation (1).  ui is an exogenous random error 
term. 
 
It may be the case that, ceteris paribus, Wine Spectator gives higher ratings to wineries that 
advertise, since Wine Spectator relies on advertising revenues.  The effect of advertising on 
rating can be estimated using a model for rating that includes advertising dummy variables.  
Since advertising prior to 1999 may have caused a wine to receive a higher rating than it 
deserved, whereas advertising in the 1999-2000 time period may have been the result of a wine 
having received a high rating, I run two separate regressions. 
To examine the relationship between advertising in 1999-2000 and rating, I formulate the model:    
Y3 = δ0 + δ1iX1i + δ2X2 + δ3ln(X3) + δ4iX4i + δ5iX5i + δ6iX6i + δ7iX7i + δ8iX8i + δ9iX7i*X8i + vi    (3) 
where Y3 is the rating the wine receives and X1 is the dummy variable for whether the winery 
advertised in 1999-2000.  X2, X3i, X4i, X5i, X6i, X7i, and X8i are defined exactly as they are for 
equation (2).  vi is an exogenous random error term. 
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The effect of advertising on rating is estimated using the specification: 
Y4 = γ0 + γ1iX1i + γ2X2 + γ3ln(X3) + γ4iX4i + γ5iX5i + γ6iX6i + γ7iX7i + γ8iX8i + γ9iX7i*X8i + wi      (4) 
where Y4 is the rating the wine receives and X1 is altered to represent the dummy variable for 
whether the winery advertised prior to 1999.  X2, X3i, X4i, X5i, X6i, X7i, and X8i are defined 
exactly as they are for equations (2) and (3), and wi is an exogenous random error term. 
 
Interpretation of Coefficients 
 
α0, β0, δ0, and γ0 are the intercepts (constant terms) for equations (1), (2), (3), and (4), 
respectively.  
 
α4, α5, α6, α7, α8, α9, β2, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8, β9, δ1, δ2, δ4, δ5, δ6, δ7, δ8, δ9, γ1, γ2, γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7, γ8, and 
γ9 are linear coefficients.  An increase of one unit of a continuous variable, or a value of 1 for a 
dummy variable, corresponding to a particular coefficient increases the dependent variable by an 
amount equal to the coefficient.   
 
α3, β3, δ3, and γ3 are coefficients for ln(X3) in the respective equations (1), (2), (3), and (4).  
When all other variables are held constant, the following equation results from equation (1): 
Y1 = α3*ln(bX3) + c       (5) 
where b and c are some constants.  Equation (5) can be manipulated to produce: 
  Y1 = α3*ln(b) + α3*ln(X3) + c     (6) 
so doubling X would result in an increase in Y1 of α3*ln(2).   
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Issues 
Heteroskedasticity has been taken into consideration by generating and examining robust 
standard errors for each of the four regressions specified in equations (1) through (4).  It was 
found that robust standard errors were extremely similar if not identical to regular standard errors 
generated by ordinary least-squares.  There may exist some autocorrelation of advertising 
variables; unfortunately, I cannot determine whether serial correlation is present because data is 
incomplete. 
 
IV.  Results 
Estimates of the wine price function specified in equation (1) are reported in Figure 3.  
Wines for which only one case was produced and all dummy variables are jointly equal to zero 
were priced at $32.99 on average.  Doubling the number of cases produced decreased price by 
3.41*ln(2) dollars, or $2.36.  All of the results for country, vintage year, and type were 
insignificant.  Most of the coefficients for region and varietal dummy variables were 
insignificant; however, ceteris paribus, wines from the region of Australia were priced $35.27 
higher than wines from Argentina (the omitted dummy variable).  Wines from California were 
priced $7.39 higher and wines from Washington State were priced $2.63 lower than wines from 
Argentina, holding all other variables constant.  Wines of the Petit Verdot varietal cost $45.03 
more than wines of the missing varietal (the omitted dummy variable), all else being constant.  F-
test 1 indicated that there is a chance that all dummy variables for country are jointly equal to 
zero.  F-test 2 showed that there is a reasonable probability that all dummy variables for vintage 
year are jointly insignificant.  The p-lim for Test 1 was found to be 0.2999 and the p-lim for Test 
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2 was calculated as 0.4736.  Since the R2 is 0.3604, the regression model fails to fully explain the 
existing variance of wine price.      
 
Figure 3.  
Determinants of Wine Price 
Independent Variable   |  Dependent Variable: Price     
intercept      32.99 
       (2.03) 
 
ln(cases produced)     - 3.41 
               (-27.32) 
 
dummy for region 2     35.27 
 (Australia)     (2.61) 
 
dummy for region 4      7.39 
 (California)     (9.03) 
 
dummy for region 38     - 2.63 
 (Washington State)    (2.33) 
 
dummy for varietal 43     45.03 
 (Petit Verdot)      (2.78) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
F-tests:  Test 1:  0.2999 
  T est 2:  0.4736 
 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.  The table shows the ordinary least-squares estimate of wine 
price.  The number of observations is 5356.  The R2 is 0.3604.  In addition to the variables listed, the regression 
included dummy variables for 38 regions, 2 types, 74 varietals, 5 countries, 4 vintage years, and the interaction 
between country and vintage year.  Coefficients for country and vintage year had insignificant t statistics; however, 
coefficients for some regions and one varietal were significant.  F-tests - Test 1: Dummy variables for country 
jointly insignificant; Test 2: Dummy variables for vintage jointly insignificant. 
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Figure 4 presents the results of the regression specified in equation (2).  Assuming that 
one case of a wine was produced and all dummy variables were jointly equal to zero, the 
minimum rating the wine could have received was 79.76.  An increase in price of $1 
corresponded to a 0.0942 increase in rating.  Figure 4 indicates a positive correlation between 
wine price and rating given by Wine Spectator.  This positive correlation seems relatively small 
because wine price has a larger range than wine rating.  An R2 of 0.3484 indicates that this 
particular specification only explains a portion of the variance of wine rating. 
 
Figure 4. 
Effect of Wine Price on Wine Spectator Rating 
Independent Variable   |  Dependent Variable: Wine Spectator Rating   
intercept      79.76 
                 (20.86)  
 
price         0.0942 
                 (28.91) 
 
ln(cases produced)     -0.0241 
                 (-0.767) 
 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.  The table shows the ordinary least-squares estimate of wine 
rating.  The number of observations is 5356.  The R2 is 0.3484.  In addition to the variables listed, the regression 
included dummy variables for 38 regions, 2 types, 74 varietals, 5 countries, 4 vintage years, and the interaction 
between country and vintage year. 
 
 Figure 5 compares variations in mean score and mean price, based on vintage year.  The 
most recent wines, as they are furthest from reaching maturation, have lower average scores and 
prices than older wines.  Mean price seems to have a greater rate of decrease than mean score, as 
indicated by the slope of the two lines on the graph.  However, the range of prices is greater than 
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the range of scores, so a seemingly large decrease in price can correspond to the same percentage 
decrease as a seemingly small decrease in rating. 
  
Figure 5. Variation in Mean Score Compared to Variation in Mean Price, Based on Vintage Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Estimates of the correlation between advertising and rating are shown in Figure 6.  The 
coefficient on advertising prior to 1999 corresponds to γ1 in equation (4), whereas the coefficient 
on advertising in 1999-2000 relates to δ1 in equation (3).  Advertising prior to 1999 was thought 
to have possibly biased Wine Spectator ratings; however, the positive coefficient of 0.192 is 
insignificant at the 5% level.  Therefore, although the coefficient indicates a positive correlation 
between advertising prior to 1999 and wine rating, the placement of advertisements prior to 
review may not have affected ratings.  The dummy variable on advertising between January 
1999 and December 2000 has an estimated coefficient of 0.402 with a significant t statistic of 
3.33, indicating a positive correlation between rating and advertising in 1999-2000.  The 
regression model which includes advertising prior to 1999 produced an R2 of 0.3487 and the 
 13 
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje 
specification which includes advertising in 1999-2000 resulted in an R2 of 0.3498.  Both of these 
R2 values are slightly larger than the R2 of 0.3484 produced by the rating estimation that 
excluded advertising data.  Therefore, the specifications that include advertising variables 
explain variance in rating to a greater extent than the model that excludes advertising data. 
 
Figure 6.  
Effects of Advertising on Wine Spectator Rating 
      Dependent Variable: Wine Spectator Rating 
Independent Variable   |   1    2   
advertising in 1999-2000    0.402 
                 (3.33)  
 
advertising prior to 1999        0.192 
                      (1.42) 
 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.  The table shows the ordinary least-squares estimates of the 
coefficients of advertising on wine rating.  The coefficients of advertising in 1999-2000 and advertising prior to 
1999 were found using two separate regressions.  The number of observations is 5356.  The R2 is 0.3498 for the 
regression run on advertising in 1999-2000 and 0.3487 for the regression run on advertising prior to 1999.  In 
addition to the variables listed, the regression included price, ln(cases produced), and dummy variables for 38 
regions, 2 types, 74 varietals, 5 countries, 4 vintage years, and the interaction between country and vintage year. 
 
 
V.  Conclusion 
Regression results based on the estimation of price in this paper show that prices of 
immature wines are not as strongly correlated to vintage growing-season characteristics than 
auction prices of mature wines.  In fact, the models I specified yielded insignificant coefficients 
for many of the dummy variables for growing conditions such as country, region, type, and 
vintage year.  F-tests indicated reasonable probabilities that coefficients for dummy variables for 
vintage year were jointly insignificant and that coefficients for country dummy variables were 
also jointly equal to zero.  Therefore, this paper indicates that prices of immature wines do not 
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follow the same specification as the model for mature wines devised by Ashenfelter, Ashmore, 
and Lalonde (1995).  The specification for wine pricing used in this paper produced a negative 
coefficient of ln(cases produced) on wine price.  Holding all other variables constant, doubling 
the number of cases produced decreases wine price by $2.36, on average; this is consistent with 
the laws of supply and demand.  A few regions and one varietal had significant effects on wine 
price, indicating some correlation between price, regional weather, and growing conditions. 
  Wine ratings given by Wine Spectator are positively correlated with wine price.  This 
result was reached by Shewbridge (1998) in his study of wines reviewed in issues of Wine 
Spectator in 1994 and has been replicated in this paper, using data from 1995 to the present.  I 
have found that a $1 increase in wine price corresponds to a 0.0942 increase in wine rating.  
Assuming that there are no regional or weather fixed effects and that one case of wine was 
produced, the lowest rating is 79 points.  Wine prices range from a few dollars to many 
thousands of dollars.  Since wine prices have a larger range than wine ratings, the coefficient of 
wine price on wine rating is less than one.  It is found that the number of cases produced has no 
effect on wine rating; this may be a result of the production quantity of wine depending more on 
crop (grape) yields than wine quality.  Graphs generated by Shewbridge show that the vast 
majority of expensive wines are of high quality; therefore, very few wineries are setting prices 
misrepresentative of wine quality. 
Advertising prior to the review of a wine does not affect rating, as evidenced by 
regression results in Figure 6.  Estimates indicate no correlation between advertising prior to 
1999 and ratings given by Wine Spectator.  However, receiving slightly better reviews may cause 
wineries to advertise, as shown by the small positive correlation between advertising during 
1999-2000 and Wine Spectator ratings. 
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According to Reuter (2000), the consumer wishes to find the highest quality of wine for 
consumption or the most undervalued wine for investment purposes.  Experts disagree on 
whether to base predictions of quality on tasting impressions or statistics.  Although this paper 
sheds some light on the relationships among wine prices, ratings, advertising, and production, 
questions remain as to the proper method of determining which wines to buy.  
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